

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 WARSAW 05334 01 OF 02 012109Z

61

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
----- 095322

O 011654Z AUG 76

FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2970

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 WARSAW 5334

STADIS//////////

EXDIS

DELIVER OPENING OF BUSINESS AUGUST 2 TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY
IRVING, OES AND ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OES/OFA
FROM USDEL AMBASSADOR RIDGWAY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: EFIS, MX, UR, JA, PO

SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES NEGOTIATIONS: POLAND, MEXICO;
USSR, JAPEN AND WHERE WE GO FROM HERE

REF: (A) MEXICO 9659, (B) MEXICO 9574, (C) STATE 189503
(D) MOSCOW 12102R

1. BY THE TIME YOU RECEIVE THIS MESSAGE, WE SHOULD HAVE
SIGNED WITH POLAND OUR FIRST GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL
FISHERIES AGREEMENT FOLLOWING PASSAGE OF THE FISHERIES
CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976. WHAT FOLLOWS
IS A PERSONAL REPORT TO YOU ON THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT
HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE COURSE OF THIS TRIP AND THOSE
THAT LIE AHEAD IN THE FUTURE.

2. POLAND. THERE WERE NO CHANGES IN SUBSTANCE IN THE
TEXT OF THE ANTICIPATED AGREEMENT WE BROUGHT WITH US
TO WARSAW AND I AND DAVE COLSOC HAVE CLEARED FOR OES
AND L RESPECTIVELY. THE EMBASSY IS SEEKING CONCURRENCE
FROM EUR ON THE TREATMENT OF THE ECONOMIC COOPERATION/
TRADE ISSUE WHICH HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO AN AGREED MINUTE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 WARSAW 05334 01 OF 02 012109Z

AN INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE INTO THE EXISTING JOINT

POLISH/AMERICAN TRADE COMMISSION AS AN ITEM WHICH WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR FUTURE ANNUAL CONSULTATIONS OF THAT COMMISSION. WE EXPECT NO PROBLEMS TO ARISE AND THE TEXTS IN POLISH AND ENGLISH ARE BEING PREPARED OVER THIS WEEKEND FOR SIGNATURE IN WARSAW ON MONDAY, AUGUST 2 AT APPROXIMATELY 6:00 P.M.

3. THERE MAY BE SOME QUESTION AS TO WHY THE U.S. CHOSE TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT IN WARSAW AND I THINK THE STRAIGHT-FORWARD ANSWER IS BY FAR THE BEST. WE HAD A NEGOTIATING TEAM IN EUROPE, THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD REACHED THE POINT AT WHICH THEY COULD BE QUICKLY CONCLUDED, IT TOOK A WEEK-END STOP TO WRAP THINGS UP. SO WHY NOT SIGN IN WARSAW. THE U.S. HAS NO NEED OF SYMBOLS, JUST SOLID AGREEMENTS TO CARRY OUT THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW LEGISLATION. WE BELIEVE WE HAVE A SOLID AGREEMENT. WE HAVE EVEN BEEN ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE THE CONCERN EXPRESSED BY SENATOR STEVENS CONCERNING THE USE OF NUMBERS IN

DESCRIBING WHAT POLAND MIGHT EXPECT TO APPLY FOR IN ITS ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC FISHERIES.

4. WHAT I AM NOW MOST CONCERNED ABOUT IS NOT THE UNFOLDING OF THE REMAINDER OF THE NEGOTIATING SCHEDULE FOR THESE BILATERALS, BUT RATHER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACT IN THOSE AREAS IN WHICH IT TOUCHES UPON INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES. THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH POLAND HAVE TURNED UP MANY QUESTIONS WHICH WE CANNOT ANSWER AND WE HAVE HAD TO ASK THE POLES TO TRUST US TO BE REASONABLE. IN OTHER AREAS, FOR EXAMPLE, SUCH A SEEMINGLY MUNDANE CONCERN AS ASSIGNING LOADING ZONES WITHIN THE NEW 200-MILE ZONE, WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN HERE TO DESCRIBE WHAT SEEMED TO US TO BE LOGICAL PROCEDURES FOR SUCH THINGS BUT I HAVE A GREAT SENSE OF UNCERTAINTY THAT THE LOGIC WILL APPEAL TO EVERYONE AS WE PROCEED TO IMPLEMENT THE ACT. IN SHORT, I FEEL CONFIDENT WE NOW HAVE ESTABLISHED A FOUNDATION ON WHICH WE CAN BUILD THE FORMAL BILATERAL AGREEMENT STRUCTURE AND WE AND DEPARTMENT MUST NOW TURN OUR EFFORTS TO THE INTRAGENCY FRAMEWORK AND TO THE ROLE ASSIGNED US IN CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 WARSAW 05334 01 OF 02 012109Z

REGIONAL COUNCILS TO ENSURE A PROPER CONSIDERATION OF OUR VIEWS. THIS RELATES TO SUCH MATTERS AS FEES, DETERMINATION OF SURPLUS, PREPARATION OF PERMIT FORMS (THE PROPOSED FORM IS NOW SEVERAL PAGES LONG AND MUST BE PREPARED FOR EACH VESSEL), COORDINATION WITH COAST

GUARD ON PROPOSED ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND ESTABLISHING OUR PRESENCE ON THE REGIONAL COUNCIL WHICH WILL BE

FORMED AUGUST 11.

5. WE WILL SEND YOU BY SEPTTEL A PROPOSED PRESS RELEASE TO BE ISSUE IN WASHINGTON CONCERNING THE NEW AGREEMENT. I WOULD BE HELPFUL IF OFA WOULD BEGIN IMMEDIATELY TO IDENTIFY THE PROCEDURES BY WHICH THESE AGREEMENTS WILL MOVE FORWARD THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT TO THE WHITE HOUSE FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS AS REQUIRED BY THE LAW.

6. MEXICO. OUR ARRIVAL IN WARSAW WAS THE FIRST CHANCE I HAD TO READ CAREFULLY THE TRAFFIC ON THE MEXICAN NEGOTIATIONS. I HAVE SEVERAL CONCERNS ABOUT THEM I WILL BE SENDING TO MEXICO CITY FROM HERE A MESSAGE ASKING FOR AS DETAILED A REPORT AS IS NOW POSSIBLE TO PREPARE ON THE TERMS OF THE MEXICO/CUBA AGREEMENT. IT IS COMFORTING TO NOTE THAT THE MEXICAN TREATMENT OF CUBA WITH RESPECT TO THE PHASE-DOWN/PHASE-OUT OF THE CUBAN SHRIMPING EFFORT IN THE GULF HAS REMAINED INTACT, BUT THE FACT THAT THE CUBAN FISHERY HAS BEEN ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN THE CAMPECHE AREA IS UNSETTLING TO SAY THE LEAST. IT WILL NOT HELP US WITH HANDLING THE PROBLEM WE WILL NOW HAVE WITH THE TEXAS SHRIMP ASSOCIATION.

7 IN THAT CONNECTION, I FIND IT QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE THAT THE TEXAS SHRIMP ASSOCIATION OPPOSES THE AGREEMENT. THEY COULD HARDLY BE ASKED TO SUPPORT TERMS WHICH WOULD BE TO THEIR DEFINITE CLOSE-OUT FROM THE GULF. AT THE SAME TIME, I FIND MYSELF WONDERING WHETHER THEIR POSITION IS THAT OF AN ASSOCIATION WITH A CONSTITUENCY OR IS INTENDED TO ANNOUNCE THE BEGINNING OF A CAMPAIGN
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 WARSAW 05334 01 OF 02 012109Z

TO PREVENT OUR REACHING AGREEMENT.

8. I HAVE TURNED OVER IN MY MIND THE ELEMENTS IN THE PROPOSED U.S./MEXICAN AGREEMENT AND REMAIN CONVINCED THAT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF HOW THE PHASE-OUT IS TO BE MANAGED, THE U.S. WITH ITS OWN DOMESTIC LEGISLATION IN PLACE CAN DO NO LESS THAN ACCEPT THE TERMS OFFERED BY MEXICO. WE HAVE ALWAYS KNOWN, AS INDEED THE DISTANT-WATER INDUSTRY HAS ALWAYS KNOWN, THAT THE FAILURE OF THE LEGISLATION TO COME TO GRIPS EXPLICITLY WITH THE QUESTION OF HOW TO PROTECT THE DISTANT-WATER FLEET

WOULD MEAN ONLY THAT THAT QUESTION WOULD BE ANSWERED THROUGH INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE THE ANSWER BEFORE US IN THE PROPOSED MEXICAN AGREEMENT.

NEVERTHELESS, IF WE ARE GOING TO HAVE THE ACTIVE
OPPOSITION OF THE INDUSTRY AS A BACKDROP TO OUR
NEGOTIATIONS, I THINK SOME ATTENTION MUST BE PAID TO
ALERTING OTHERS IN THE GOVERNMENT SO THAT THE DECISION
TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT WHOSE TERMS, IN MY VIEW, ARE NOT
GOING TO CHANGE DRAMATICALLY, CAN BE PRECEDED BY
CONSIDERATION OF THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE
AGREEMENT AT THIS TIME AND IN A TEXAS, FLORIDA,
CALIFORNIA SETTING.

9. I DO NOT INTEND TO PROCEED DIRECTLY TO NEW YORK
FROM WARSAW. IN THE FIRST PLACE, ALL OF US ARE WRUNG
OUT AFTER AN ARDUOUS TEN DAYS HERE TO WHICH MUST BE
ADDED THE WEEK OF MEXICAN NEGOTIATIONS WHICH PRECEDED
OUR DEPARTURE. WE NEED A MOMENT TO TURN AROUND AND TO
COLLECT OURSELVES IN THE PROCESS. I WOULD APPRECIATE
IT IF OFA WOULD OBTAIN THE NECESSARY ORDERS FOR ME
AND MRS. COLLISON TO RETURN TO NEW YORK FROM WASHINGTON.
AS TO DATE OF OUR RETURN, IT WOULD APPEAR WE ARE
COMMITTED NOW TO BE AVAILABLE THE EVENING OF AUGUST 4
FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH INDUSTRY AND THE REOPENING
OF TALKS WITH THE MEXICANS ON AUGUST 5. I THINK IT
WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR OFA TO ENGAGE IN SOME INFORMAT
CONSULTATIONS WITH THE NSC STAFF, WHICH WAS APPROACHED
BEFORE OUR TRIP TO MEXICO BY SHRIMP INDUSTRY REPRESENTATIVES CONCERNING A PRESIDENT-TO-PRESIDENT CONTACT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 WARSAW 05334 01 OF 02 012109Z

ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE AGREEMENT. I WOULD NOT RECOMMEND SUCH CONTACT UNTIL WE SEE WHERE ALL OF OUR PROBLEMS ARE. THIS ITSELF IS DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE WITHOUT KNOWING THE PRECISE TERMS OF THE MEXICO/CUBA AGREEMENT WHICH WE WOULD HOPE TO HAVE AVAILABLE TO US FOR REVIEW IN THE DEPARTMENT ON AUGUST 4 BEFORE MY DEPARTURE FOR NEW YORK.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 WARSAW 05334 02 OF 02 012118Z

61
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
----- 095338

O 011654Z AUG 76
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2971

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 WARSAW 5334

STADIS//////////

EXDIS

10. USSR. I REFERRED TO THE NEED FOR SOME TURN-
AROUND TIME IN THE STATES BEFORE GOING ON TO NEW YORK.
THIS STEMS MOSTLY FROM OUR EXPERIENCES IN THE USSR.

WE HAD TWO DAYS OF NEGOTIATION, JULY 26 AND JULY 30.

IN BETWEEN, WE HAVE BEEN TRUNDLED ALL OVER SOVIET-
GEORGIA ON A SCHEDULE ORIGINALLY PLANNED FOR FIVE DAYS
WHICH WAS NOT REDUCED WHEN OUR SCHEDULE CHANGED; IT
WAS ONLY TELESCOPED INTO THREE DAYS, WE ARE TOLD BY
OLD HANDS THAT OUR REACTIONS TO THE EXPERIENCE ARE
TYPICAL -- THAT ISN'T MUCH COMFORT. AS FOR THE NEGO-
TIATIONS THEMSELVES, THEY WENT AS EXPECTED.

11. WE WILL BE BRINGING BACK AN AGREEMENT WHICH IS BRACKELED
IN SEVERAL KEY AREAS, REFLECTING DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR ON THE EXTENSION OF NATIONAL
FISHERIES JURISDICTION BY UNILATERAL ACTION. THESE
RELATE TO PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS, ENFORCEMENT SCHEMES,
JURISDICTION IN THE COURTS, ETC. THROUGHOUT THE TWO
DAYS, THE SOVIET SIDE REFERRED TO THE PROBLEMS CREATED
BY "TIMING" AND THE NEED TO MAKE WHATEVER PROGRESS WE
COULD WITHOUT RAISING DIFFICULT ISSUES WHICH THE
PASSAGE OF TIME WOULD RESOLVE. IN A PRIVATE CONVERSA-
TION WITH THE SOVIET HEAD OF DELEGATION, FIRST DEPUTY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 WARSAW 05334 02 OF 02 012118Z

MINISTER KAMENTSEV, HE STATED THAT IN HIS VIEW OUR
NEGOTIATING SCHEDULE SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE LAW
OF THE SEA CONFERENCE; THE NEED FOR THE USSR DELEGATION
TO REVIEW THE RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE IN THE PERIOD
FOLLOWING THE SEPTEMBER 17 ADJOURNMENT OF THE CONFERE-
ENCE; THE INHERENT SLOWNESS OF ANY BUREAUCRACY CON-
FRONTED WITH A DRAMATIC DECISION SUCH AS "CUTTING THE
KNOT THAT BINDS UP THE SOVIET POSITION ON UNILATERAL
EXTENSIONS OF JURISDICTION"; AND THE CONCLUSION OF STEPS

NECESSARY TO BRING THE SOVIETS TO THE POINT THAT WE HAVE REACHED REGARDING FISHERIES JURISDICTION AND 200 MILES. THE REFERENCE TO A 200-MILE ZONE FOR THE USSR WAS EXPLICIT AND I LEFT MOSCOW WITH NO DOUBT THAT THE SOVIETS INTEND, WITHIN A SHORT TIME, TO EXTEND THEIR JURISDICTION.

12. TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE MOST LIKELY SCENARIO AS DESCRIBED BY KAMENTSEV, WE TOGETHER DECIDED THAT WE SHOULD NOT RESUME OUR NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL NOVEMBER: AT WHICH TIME, HOWEVER, WE WILL NEED AT LEAST TWO WEEKS TO WRAP UP AN

R# AGREEMENT. THE PRINCIPLES SHOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT TO HANDLE IF INDEED THE SCENARIO REGARDING JURISDICTION UNFOLDS AS DESCRIBED. CLEARLY, WE ARE GOING TO HAVE PROBLEMS ON THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF FUTURE SOVIET FISHING ACTIVITIES. THEY REMAIN INCREDULOUS AT PROCEDURES ENVISAGED IN OUR LAW. THEY DO NOT UNDER-

STAND THAT THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE TRADITIONAL NEGOTIATION OF NUMBERS OF FISH AND NUMBERS OF VESSELS WILL NOT EXIST. THESE PRACTICAL ASPECTS MAY BE THE ONES ON WHICH OUR OPTIMISTIC PREDICTION ABOUT REACHING AGREEMENT ON PRINCIPLES WILL FLOUNDER.

13. JAPAN. WHILE IN MOSCOW AND WARSAW, WE WERE ADVISED BY OUR COUNTERPARTS OF INTENSIVE JAPANESE EFFORTS FIRST TO FIND OUT WHAT IS GOING ON, AND, SECOND, IN THE CASE OF THE SOVIET UNION, TO SUGGEST THAT A USSR/JAPAN ALLIANCE IN TIME OF FISHER DIFFICULTY WOULD SERVE BOTH COUNTRIES WELL IN TERMS OF THEIR POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE U.S. AND ITS EXTENDED JURISDICTION. WE WERE, AT CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 WARSAW 05334 02 OF 02 012118Z

FIRST SUSPICIOUS OF THE SOVIET REPORTS, THINKING THEY MIGHT BE INTENDED TO CAUSE PROBLEMS BETWEEN U.S. AND JAPAN IN THAT THEY WOULD REDOUND TO THE BENEFIT OF THE USSR. THESE SUSPICIONS MAY YET HAVE SOME VALIDITY. WHEN KAMENTSEV SPOKE DIRECTLY TO ME OF THE MATTER, HOWEVER, HE DID SO IN THE CONTEXT OF ASKING WHETHER I WAS FOLLOWING PRESS REPORTS IN JAPAN AS HE WAS AND, IF SO, WAS I CONCERNED THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MAY HAVE ITSELF CREATED A DOMESTIC POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE SURROUNDING THE QUESTION OF FISHERIES WHICH WILL MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO NEGOTIATE. I TOLD HIM I HAD NOT SEEN MANY OF THE JAPANESE REPORTS AND CERTAINLY NOT THE MOST RECENT ONES SINCE I HAVE BEEN TRAVELING, BUT THAT I HAD BEEN AWARE OF A MID -JUNE REPORT OF SOVIET/JAPANESE CONSULTATIONS ON HOW TO RESIST THE U.S. IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS

CLAIM, AND SAID WE WERE SURPRISED BY SUCH REPORTS AND TRUSTED THEY WERE NOT ACCURATE. HE SAID THEY WERE NOT; THAT THE SOVIETS WERE COMMITTED TO NEGOTIATING NEW ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE U.S. IN WARSAW, THE POLISH DELEGATION WAS JOKING ABOUT THE EFFORTS OF THE JAPANESE EMBASSY HERE TO OBTAIN INFORMATION. INCLUDING REFERENCES TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY WERE HIDING UNDER THE TABLES AT THE AIRPORT. I DON'T THINK WE NEED TO REACH CONCLUSIONS ABOUT WHAT THE JAPANESE CAMPAIGN MEANS FOR THE U.S. AS OUR NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES ARE CLEAR, BUT IT IS INTERESTING TO SPECULATE ON WHAT THE JAPANESE MIGHT THINK THEY ARE DOING.

14. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? LARRY SNEAD AND NICK SCHOWENGERDT ARE GOING ON FROM HERE TO BUCHAREST, SOFIA AND ROME TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR ADDITIONAL BILATERALS. IF THEY ARE SUCCESSFUL AT PRODUCING PROPOSED AGREEMENTS, I WOULD SUGGEST THAT WE ANTICIPATE THEIR SIGNATURE IN WASHINGTON. AS FOR MYSELF, I FIND THAT ONCE PAST THE MEXICAN PROBLEM, I AM AGAIN FACED WITH THE QUESTION, IS THIS REALLY THE ONLY WAY TO GET THE JOB DONE? I AM MORE THAN EVER CONVINCED THAT IT IS NOT; IT IS PART OF A RATION, BUT ONLY THAT. I THINK WE SHOULD LOOK FORWARD TO THE USE OF TEAMS TO NEGOTIATE, USING EMBASSIES IN THE BIZAMLD#FOR
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 WARSAW 05334 02 OF 02 012118Z

MINIMAL REVIEW AND SIGNATURE IN WASHINGTON. THIS PROCESS MAY REQUIRE MORE CUMBERSOME COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES, BUT I THINK THE BILATERALS (EXCEPTING THE USSR: JAPAN, MEXICO, KOREA AND CANADA) CAN BE HANDLED IN THIS FASHION. I WOULD EXPECT THE KOREAN NEGOTIATIONS TO GIVE US A READING ON WHETHER WE CAN BORROW OTHER PEOPLE IN THE DEPARTMENT AS WELL AS AMBASSADORS IN THE FIELD. I THINK WE CAN. THIS MAY TURN OUT TO BE POLITICALLY UNTENABLE, SINCE THE

TRADITION INCLUDES AN ASSUMPTION BY CONGRESS AND THE INDUSTRY THAT THEY HAVE NEED OF THEIR "OWN" AMBASSADOR, BUT I THINK WE SHOULD GIVE IT A FAIR AND EXTENDED TRY SO THAT I CAN SPEND MY TIME IN WASHINGTON.

15. I WILL BE IN THE OFFICE ON AUGUST 4 AND WILL REPORT MORE COMPLETELY AT THAT TIME.
BROWN

NOTE BY OC/T: #WARSAW 5334 AS RECEIVED, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MEETING REPORTS, NEGOTIATIONS, FISHING AGREEMENTS, TRADE AGREEMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 01 AUG 1976
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: CunninFX
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976WARSAW05334
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: RR
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760296-1098
From: WARSAW
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760898/aaaadhzs.tel
Line Count: 381
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: STADIS, EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: STADIS, EXDIS
Reference: 76 MEXICO 9659, 76 MEXICO 9574, 76 STATE 189503, 76 MOSCOW 12102
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: CunninFX
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 12 APR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <12 APR 2004 by CollinP0>; APPROVED <03 AUG 2004 by CunninFX>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES NEGOTIATIONS: POLAND, MEXICO; USSR, JAPEN AND WHERE WE GO FROM HERE
TAGS: EFIS, MX, UR, JA, PO
To: SECSTATE WASHDC
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006